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As we enter the Fourth Industrial Revolution, ushered in by ubiquitous cyber-physical 
systems, the Internet of Things, and the Internet of Systems, our legal precedents are lagging 
behind our technical innovations.1 In his 2017 book, The Fourth Industrial Revolution, Klaus 
Schwab describes how this revolution is different from all the previous epochs. The First 
Industrial Revolution began in the latter half of the 18th century and focused on the power of 
the steam engine, which lead to the mechanization of many manufacturing industries. The 
Second Industrial Revolution began late in the 19th century and was characterized by 
scientific advancements such as electricity that enabled mass production. The Third 
Industrial Revolution began in the late 1950s and marked the shift from analog to digital 
through computing. The Fourth Industrial Revolution, Schwab explains, is happening now 
and does not resemble anything we have seen before. It is disrupting nearly every academic 
discipline, professional industry, and the global economy in a non-linear way. The Fourth 
Industrial Revolution is characterized by the way in which the physical, digital, and biological 
spheres of an individual’s life are connecting at a speed previously unseen. The speed, 
quantity, and efficacy with which the Fourth Industrial Revolution is raging throughout the 
globe have strained the legal frameworks tasked with protecting citizens from the unintended 
consequences of such massive innovation. 
Advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI), Machine Learning (ML), Algorithmic Decision 
Systems (ADS), and other approaches t0 training computers in decision-making are at the 
forefront of a new set of challenges to our legal frameworks. These systems are becoming so 
sophisticated that institutions are replacing human decision-makers with automated systems 
to boost efficiency and consistency. We see their dissemination in policing decisions, such as 
 
1 Schwab, Klaus. The Fourth Industrial Revolution. Portfolio Penguin, 2017.  
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in so-called ‘predictive policing,’ where police apply statistical or machine learning algorithms 
to data from police records to look for potential patterns that predict when, where or what 
crime may be committed.2 We see their dissemination in courtroom decisions where judges 
use computerized systems risk assessments to inform who can be set free at every stage of the 
criminal justice process.3 We see their dissemination in insurance decisions where state 
government agencies use automated systems to determine if a claimant has committed 
insurance fraud.4  In short, we see their dissemination across a wide range of industries that 
utilize complex decision-making in their operation.  
One important question that arises from these advances and their dissemination 
throughout society is whether and how these systems output can be used in legal proceedings. 
Under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, “no Warrants shall [be] 
issue[d], but upon probable cause.” This stipulation means citizens are secure from searches 
and seizures of their persons, houses, papers, and effects unless probable cause can be 
established. In United States criminal law, probable cause is the standard of reasonable 
grounds by which police have a suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong to 
justify a prudent and cautious person’s belief that specific facts are probably true.5  An 
Algorithmic Decision System (ADS) could be built to address applications for search 
warrants, trained to look at evidence to establish whether probable cause exists and, produce 
an output of probable cause with given statistical likelihoods. Under this definition, could a 
 
2 Lacambra, S. (2017, October 30). Predictive Policing one pager. Retrieved from 
https://www.eff.org/document/predictive-policing-one-pager 
3 Angwin, J., Larson, J., Kirchner, L., & Mattu, S. (2019, March 9). Machine Bias. Retrieved from 
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing 
4 Felton, R. (2016, December 18). Michigan unemployment agency made 20,000 false fraud accusations – report. 
Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/dec/18/michigan-unemployment-agency-fraud-
accusations  
5 Handler, J. G. (1994) Ballentine's Law Dictionary (Legal Assistant ed.). Albany: Delmar. p. 431. ISBN 0827348746. 
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judge consider the output of the aforementioned ADS to establish probable cause for a search 
warrant? 
Legal scholarship has not yet definitively answered this question, although Orin Kerr, 
a professor of law at the UC Berkeley School of Law, wrote a compelling defense for keeping 
quantification out of the court room. Kerr suggests quantification specifically of “probable 
cause would eclipse intuitions and instead facilitate distortions of probability resulting from 
cognitive biases.”6 He reveals how quantification would lead to less accurate probable cause 
determinations because humans determine varying degrees of reasonableness through 
intuition, which is a feature of cognition machines lack. Quantification, Kerr explains, “would 
override the critical intuitions of judges about missing information in the affidavit that are 
critical to assessing probable cause accurately.” Kerr’s analysis hints at a human desire to 
quantify immaterial things that are not quantifiable, forcing such quantifications to use poor 
input or proxy variables that lead to inadequate measures of the outcome.	This potent desire 
for reification forces immaterial things that no one has a good way of quantifying to be 
reduced to an outcome that does not always make sense in a particular context.		
Think of doctors asking patients to rate the scale of their pain 1-10. Everyone’s 
tolerance for pain is different depending on what injuries, ailments, or diseases a patient has 
been exposed to before. Yet the scale remains the same 1-10. An experienced athlete who had 
dislocated their knee before can give a new dislocation a grade of six when previously they 
gave the same injury a grade of eight. A fifth grader who caught the flu for the first time can 
also rate their pain as a six, whereas the mother who catches that same strain of the flu from 
her child can rate her pain a two. The flu and a dislocated knee are very different kinds of 
 
6 Kerr, Orin S., Why Courts Should Not Quantify Probable Cause (March 28, 2011). The Political Heart of 
Criminal Procedure: Essays on Themes of William J. Stuntz (Michael Klarman, David Skeel, and Carol Steiker, 
eds), pages 131-43 (Cambridge 2012). . Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1797824 
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pain, yet they both can receive the same pain grade, revealing a shortcoming in the pain 
quantification system. It is the doctor’s responsibility to determine the reasonableness of the 
pain grade by utilizing their critical intuition contrived from their knowledge of the patient 
and the ailment to assess the pain accurately, and ultimately successfully do their job. If pain 
quantification were to eclipse doctor's critical intuition in diagnosing patients and guiding 
them to appropriate healing options, what would our health care system look like? This error-
ridden vision of quantified-centric institutions is precisely the reason why Kerr's defense is so 
tenable.   
Many immaterial things are multi-dimensional, so quantification becomes tricky when 
you try to compare multiple points, on multiple axis, in multiple planes. The question of what 
becomes your combining rule for these various combinations of points, axes, and planes 
would require a complete mathematical theory for how to go about solving this problem. 
However, the mathematician’s personal values would be baked into the framework of the 
theoretical structure because their choice in picking which variables to compute would be a 
direct reflection on their values. This speaks to the differing values humans can ascribe to a 
situation that complicates the problem even further, as it is highly unlikely two humans have 
the same value base. Humans can have similar values but tend to differ on nuanced contexts 
or situations that distinguish their value set from others.  
I agree with Kerr’s disposition towards opposing quantification of probable cause. 
However, in the ten years since Kerr’s article advances in technology have made progress 
toward the opposite, making quantification of probable cause seem not only plausible but 
highly attractive in some spaces. I will take Kerr’s argument to keep quantification out of the 
courtroom a step further and contend that ADS output cannot meet the explainability 
standard required to establish probable cause in a legal proceedings, and thus should not be a 
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viable option in the courtroom.7 ADS provide black and white answers to color-filled 
questions with no explanation as to how they arrived at their conclusion. In the event the 
system does produce some form of an explanation, the explanations are often unintelligible to 
humans because the machine's infrastructure is not designed to justify its work. ADS have no 
mechanism to interpret and understand the cause of a situation nor explain how it arrived at 
its decision output. Therefore, a legal claim established from ADS does not meet the standard 
necessary for establishing probable cause under the Fourth Amendment. ADS cannot provide 
enough reliable evidence to justify the output and thus could not meet the explainability 
requirement needed for a search warrant. 
 
2. TECHNICAL APPROACHES 
The Fourth Industrial Revolution is profound because of the vast and far-reaching 
progress made in computing machinery and intelligence research. The fuel that has excited 
the modern explosion of innovation has been in place for years, finding its genesis largely in 
the work of Alan Turing, widely considered to be the father of theoretical computer science 
and Artificial Intelligence (AI).8 Turing’s seminal paper, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, 
centered around the question “Can machines think” where he explores this concept in detail 
and answers what he presumes may be common objections towards the idea.9 Two years later 
in 1952, Claude Shannon, a Bell Labs researcher, shared one of the first examples of machine 
 
7 The explainability standard will be defined infra as we survey United States legal history. Reference 
explainability section. 
8 Beavers, Anthony (2013). "Alan Turing: Mathematical Mechanist". In Cooper, S. Barry; van Leeuwen, Jan (eds.). 
Alan Turing: His Work and Impact. Waltham: Elsevier. pp. 481–485. ISBN 978-0-12-386980-7. 
9 Turing, Alan (October 1950), "Computing Machinery and Intelligence" (PDF), Mind, LIX (236): 433–460, 
doi:10.1093/mind/LIX.236.433 
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learning with the world10. Theseus, a robotic maze-solving mouse, could ‘remember’ its path 
through telephone relay switches.  
With trailblazing electromechanical devices such as Theseus emerging out of research 
labs, John McCarthy, an assistant Professor of Mathematics at Dartmouth college, recognized 
there was an opening for some development in the research area of thinking machines. In the 
summer of 1956 McCarthy organized the Dartmouth Summer Research Project on AI, where 
mathematicians, scientists, and people interested in the subject were invited to study features 
of intelligence that a machine can be made to simulate.11 The U.S. government was 
particularly supportive of machine translation research at this time because Cold War politics 
fueled their heightened interest in automatically translating documents, particularly of 
Russian origin. In 1958, the U.S. Navy funded Frank Rosenblatt, the head of the cognitive 
systems section at Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory, in his perceptron project. The perceptron 
algorithm learned by trial and error using a specific kind of neural network that simulated the 
human thought process. Rosenblatt built the perceptron algorithm with the hopes of gaining 
insights into the human brain by organizing computer systems in a way that he believed 
mimicked the organization of the human brain.  
In 1964 the United States government desired to evaluate the progress of 
computational linguistics and machine translations, so it set up a committee of seven scientists 
called the Automatic Language Processing Advisory Committee (ALPAC). The report 
subsequently produced from ALPAC’s inquiry encouraged a more basic approach to 
computational linguistics and machine translation compelling the research discipline to take 
 
10 Klein, D. (2018, December 19). Mighty mouse. Retrieved from 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612529/mighty-mouse/ 
11 McCarthy, J., Minsky, M., Rochester, N., Shannon, C.E., A Proposal for the Dartmouth Summer Research 
Project on Artificial Intelligence., http://raysolomonoff.com/dartmouth/boxa/dart564props.pdf August, 1955 
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a step back and revaluate where it was focusing its energy.12 Following ALPAC’s findings in 
1969, Marvin Minsky, a cognitive scientist best known at the time for co-founding the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s AI laboratory, published, Perceptrons: An Introduction 
to Computational Geometry, a book harshly criticizing the work of Frank Rosenblatt on his 
perceptron algorithm. This book introduced major controversy within the AI community 
centered around the fundamental divide between believing Minsky’s pessimistic predictions 
on the limitations of the perceptron or hoping that Rosenblatt’s work would usher in more 
research that could lead to ground-breaking innovation. Minsky’s pessimism was able to win 
the debate for the time being, and U.S. support for AI research was drastically decreased.   
Across the pond, the British government harbored similar reservations about the 
progress of AI research. James Lighthill’s report compiled for the British Science Research 
Council in 1973 entitled, Artificial Intelligence: A General Survey, was a cynical prognosis of 
academic research in the AI field that confirmed the British crown’s suspicions.13 Now, both 
the U.S. government and the British government had ended general support for further 
academic research into AI, leading to a period of reduced funding known as an ‘AI winter’.    
Significant AI research would not resurrect until the 1980s when Japan’s Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI), embarked on the Fifth Generation Computer 
Systems (FGCS) initiative to build supercomputers that could yield a platform for future 
advances in AI. In response the British Government used their substantial war chest to fund 
the Alvey Programme, which supported research in knowledge engineering and opened AI 
research in England again.14 The U.S. government also reacted to the changing sentiments by 
 
12 ALPAC Report, Language and Machines — Computers in Translation and Linguistics. A Report by the 
Automatic Language Processing Advisory Committee, Washington, DC, 1966 
13 James Lighthill (1973): "Artificial Intelligence: A General Survey" in Artificial Intelligence: a paper symposium, 
Science Research Council 
14 Aleksander, Igor (2013). Decision and Intelligence, Volume 6. London: Kogan Page. p. 185. ISBN 9781850914075. 
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founding the Strategic Computing Initiative under the Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA)15 which tripled funding for AI research between 1984 and 1988. This period 
in AI research was centered around a rule-based approach where computer scientists would 
give the system a set of rules and constraints to follow and observe how the program operated 
under such conditions. A popular programming language associated with AI at the time was 
Prolog. Programs coded in Prolog expressed logic in terms of relations, represented as facts 
and were useful for particular tasks that benefited from rule-based logical queries such as 
searching databases.16  
Some early AI systems required specialized hardware for its processing power. 
However, advances in hardware technology from companies such as Apple and IBM 
collapsed the market for such specialized hardware. As predicted by Moore’s Law in 1965, the 
speed and memory capacity of computers doubles every two years so the fundamental 
problem of ‘raw computer power’ would gradually be overcome.17 IBM used this shift to their 
advantage and became a leader in the AI industry, most notably for Deep Blue, their chess-
playing computer that was the first computing system to defeat Garry Kasparov, the reigning 
world chess champion in 1996. Games became the new playground for researchers to test the 
capabilities of their AI-powered computing systems. DeepMind followed suit in 2015 with 
their creation of the first deep learning AI model to “successfully learn control policies 
directly from high-dimensional sensory input.”18 The model played seven Atari 2600 games 
and outperformed previous approaches to six of the games while surpassing human experts 
 
15 McCorduck 2004, pp. 426–432, NRC 1999 under "Shift to Applied Research Increases Investment" 
16 Kowalski, R. A. (1988). "The early years of logic programming" (PDF). Communications of the ACM. 31: 38. 
doi:10.1145/35043.35046 
17 Moore, G. E. (1965). Cramming more components onto integrated circuits. Electronics, 38(8). Retrieved from 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0By83v5TWkGjvQkpBcXJKT1I1TTA/view 
18 Mnih, V., Kavukcuoglu, K., Silver, D., Graves, A., Antonoglou, I., Riedmiller, M., & Wierstra, D. (n.d.). Playing 
Atari with Deep Reinforcement Learning. DeepMind Technologies. Retrieved from 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1312.5602v1.pdf 
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on three of the games, achieving a superhuman level of play.19 The gaming programs and 
advances in computer vision that came out of this time period were early attempts at AI 
focused computing. However, they were limited in functionality because their logic was hard-
coded, only being capable of executing specific tasks to accomplish specific goals such as 
playing chess.20 Thus evolutionarily, these advances were a technological dead-end. 
  At the turn of the century, the concept and use of big data was popularized, and it 
revolutionized old conceptions about how researchers could approach computing. Big data 
typically refers to data sets with a size so great that they are beyond the ability of regular 
software tools to process the data within a reasonable amount of time. With so much data now 
available, researchers discovered they could get dramatically better performance out of neural 
networks with many layers as opposed to the few layers they were previously using. This 
breakthrough in deep neural network learning transformed research in AI as deep learning 
applications could be used across various industries. In the automotive industry, deep 
learning is pioneering the automated driver charge, helping vehicles automatically detect 
objects such as pedestrians, traffic lights, and street signs. 
Big data is the foundation for today’s machine learning methods, which are ubiquitous 
within individual’s public and private lives. People not only interact with AI almost every day 
whether they are aware of it or not, but people also contribute to machine learning algorithms 
with their personal data. The Fourth Industrial Revolution was made possible through this 
growing frequency of human-computer interactions, but the road to getting here had been in 




20 The concept of hard-coded programs will be discussed infra in the Machine Learning section. Reference 
Machine Learning section. 
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A. Algorithmic Decision Systems 
One of the technical approaches ubiquitous within our public and private institutions 
is Algorithmic Decision Systems (ADS). As a generic term, ADS encompass any deterministic 
rules-based algorithmic system. Algorithmic, in this context, refers to an explicit process or set 
of rules to be followed in calculations or other problem-solving operations. Algorithms, 
themselves, are finite and well-defined instructions that can be executed routinely. This broad 
definition does not explicitly require machine computing, although in society and in terms of 
this paper, algorithms usually refer to complex machine computing operations. This more 
conventional brand of machine-centric algorithms can be statically hand-coded by 
programmers or automatically generated from data input. In ADS, algorithms define the rules 
for which the system can then analyze high quantities of data to find correlations and parse 
relevant information out for decision-making. 
When evaluating ADS, individuals must consider every piece of information that goes 
into an algorithm and contextualize it within the programming goal. ADS typically have 
training data, which is the initial set of data used to understand how to apply its algorithm to 
given data points. Similar to humans, algorithms learn from exposure and experience, so 
training data functions as algorithms’ exposure and experience. If an ADS is built to estimate 
if there is probable cause for a police officer to search a vehicle, the training data could 
include the number of stops that turned into arrests, the number of stops that did not turn 
into arrests, and any other recorded data points that the coder feels necessary to include. They 
also have parameters that are values passed into the function, which set the bounds for what 
data the argument will evaluate. That same ADS built to estimate if there is probable cause for 
a police officer to search a vehicle would be passed a parameter such as ‘arrest’ that 
corresponds to the training data. The algorithm would have learned how to handle similar 
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parameters and would instruct the system to evaluate the arrest data point based on its 
education. ADS also can have classifiers that relate given input to particular categories of 
output.21 Sticking with our previous ADS example, classifiers in that system could be ‘arrest’ 
and ‘no arrest,’ which assign what the system evaluates into these two categories to then 
inform the output prediction. In considering how an ADS is constructed, observers can 
understand with more clarity how the system functions, for what purpose, and what recourse 
needs to be taken to rectify an error. 
Humans are involved in the construction process of building the algorithms out by 
selecting appropriate training data for the system to model and correctly labeling data for 
supervised algorithmic systems. Coders who create the algorithm make judgment calls on 
what is or is not possibly relevant to ADS, constructing the algorithm’s logic base on values 
they wish to codify. These values maybe personal, corporate, philanthropic or driven by some 
other factor that helps achieve the desired engineering goal. After this creation stage, human 
intervention in ADS output is not necessary and often entirely removed from the equation.22 
Once the algorithm is built, trained, and tested, it is ready to be deployed in the real world, 
subject to all the chaos that comes with reality.  
Public discourse around ADS has increased through recent news regarding Roger 
Stone, a prominent Republican political consultant and lobbyist, who was convicted of seven 
felonies and sentenced to around four years in federal prison. Attorney General William Barr 
and the Department of Justice (DOJ) decided that Stone’s convictions should remain in place, 
 
21 The concept of classifiers will be discussed infra in the Bad Classifier section. Reference Bad Classifier section. 
22 Castelluccia, C., & Le Métayer, D. Understanding algorithmic decision-making: Opportunities and challenges, 
Understanding algorithmic decision-making: Opportunities and challenges (2019). Retrieved from 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2019/624261/EPRS_STU(2019)624261_EN.pdf 
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but the sentence did not have to reflect the prosecution’s recommendation of nine years.23 In 
every federal criminal case involving a defendant who has been convicted, U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines are used to prescribe sentences or punishment in broad terms with the goal of 
ensuring equity.24 The guidelines offer a calculation of what the sentence should be within a 
range of months based on the offense and the characteristics of the offender. This range is 
then plotted on the U.S. Sentencing Table, which is a grid where the offense and offender 
characteristics are given numerical values. The offense numerical value is plotted on the 
vertical axis and can be increased or decreased by various factors such as threat of violence or 
pleading guilty. The offender’s characteristics numerical value is plotted on the horizontal 
axis and can be increased or decreased by evaluating the defendant’s criminal history with 
input such as how many prior convictions the offender has and how many crimes the offender 
has committed while on probation, to name a few. The point at which the offense level and 
criminal history category meet generates the recommended sentence.  
Although humans currently administer the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, this type of 
nonautomated algorithmic-based decision-making process lends itself as one of the more 
basic examples of what ADS can do and where ADS are deployed in society. However, 
dissimilar to many other ADS discussed below, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines have 
explainability. Humans operate the guidelines, and fashion all judgments remaining at the 
heart of every decision. Hence the decisions produced from these guidelines are explainable 
to humans, empowering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines to be a more acceptable form of ADS; 
despite their controversial record with overriding sentence guidelines. There are many other 
 





types of ADS percolating throughout individuals’ everyday lives, but the most powerful and 
criticized models are Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML). 
 
B. Artificial Intelligence 
AI as defined by MIT Technology Review, is ‘the quest to build machines that can 
reason, learn, and act intelligently.’25 It is a quest that started with Turning and has been 
around for many decades but has barely scratched the surface of its potential. AI, as an 
umbrella term, is used to describe much of the innovation seen in machine intelligence today, 
although many technical approaches fall under this field of study. The theory behind AI is to 
develop computer systems that can perform cognitive functions conventionally associated 
with the human mind. Some examples of these functions include visual perception, learning, 
language translation, problem-solving, speech recognition, and, most important for this paper, 
decision-making. AI research seeks to display in machines an intelligence comparable to the 
natural intelligence possessed by human beings. Engineers model AI devices to be intelligent 
agents that can perceive their environment and take actions that maximize their chance of 
successfully achieving their goals.26 AI as a broad field of academic study can be broken down 
into subfields based on technical applications. Since AI draws on so many different academic 
disciplines, the space for this division is vast and continually growing.  
 
C. Machine Learning 
Machine Learning (ML) is a practical subfield of AI that has garnered much attention 
recently for its advanced computing capabilities. On a technical level, ML is a method of data 
 
25 Artificial Intelligence. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.technologyreview.com/artificial-intelligence/ 
26 Poole, David; Mackworth, Alan; Goebel, Randy (1998). Computational Intelligence: A Logical Approach. New 
York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-510270-3. 
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analysis that automates analytical model building.27 It does this by iterating through data 
autonomously and adapting to new data by relying on previous computations. The algorithm 
is trained to learn what some unknown variable looks like. Then that association is assigned a 
numeric value through various linear algebra calculations and told to produce repeatable 
results within a given probability. Matrix operations can be used directly to solve key 
computations or provide the foundation to use more complex operations in the description of 
a machine learning method.28   
To further explain how ML functions, consider Privee, a software architecture that 
analyzes website privacy policies. Privee uses ML to perform automatic classifications on 
inputted privacy policies by checking if the inputted privacy policy matches privacy policies in 
its repository.29 If so, the policy is labeled with an overall letter grade that is based on the 
classification metrics it was trained on and displays the label to the user. If the inputted 
privacy policy does not match privacy policies in its repository, the policy is evaluated by 
either the rule classifier, the ML classifier, or both to determine the policy’s classification.30 
Once the classification is determined the algorithm trains itself on the new policy and stores 
that classification with the other training policies it has learned, completing the nonlinear 
feedback loop. Then the policy is labeled and displayed to the user.  
The foundational idea for ML arose when AI based systems were trying to solve the 
problem of how to address hard-coded programs.31 Hard-coded programs are a software 
 
27 Machine Learning: What it is and why it matters. (n.d.). Retrieved from 
https://www.sas.com/en_us/insights/analytics/machine-learning.html 
28 Brownlee, J. (2019, August 9). A Gentle Introduction to Matrix Operations for Machine Learning. Retrieved 
from https://machinelearningmastery.com/matrix-operations-for-machine-learning/ 
29 Sebastian Zimmeck and Steven M. Bellovin. Privee: An architecture for automatically analyzing web privacy 
policies. In 23rd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 14), pages 1--16, San Diego, CA, August 2014. 
USENIX Association. 
30 The concept of classifiers will be discussed infra in the Bad Classifier section. Reference Bad Classifier section. 
31 Khan, M., Jan, B., & Farman, H. (2019). Deep Learning: Convergence to Big Data Analytics. Springer Singapore. 
doi: 10.1007/978-981-13-3459-7 
 18 
development practice of embedding data directly into the source code of a program as 
opposed to getting the data from external sources or generating it at run-time. This practice 
can be problematic because the static nature of hard-coded programs means they cannot 
adapt to innovation. An inability to adjust to change can result in becoming obsolete at the 
hands of such change, and hard-coded programs are experiencing such a fate. In modern 
computer science circles, hard-coded programs are seen as a failure of technology to predict 
and address problem test cases adequately. Thus, this failure led to a train of thought that 
envisioned placing machines in the driver’s seat of extracting patterns from the data by 
themselves, freeing them from their previous static programming nature. 
 
D. Supervised & Unsupervised Learning 
Like AI in general, ML has a broad array of methods it can deploy in programs, two of 
them being supervised learning and unsupervised learning. Supervised learning uses data sets 
containing training examples with associated correct labels as prior knowledge to anticipate 
what the output will be.32 The program learns the relationship between the training example 
and the associated correct label by identifying patterns in the data and forming heuristics. 
Heuristics are techniques designed to expedite the problem-solving process and find 
approximate answers. They are short-cut rules of thumb that guide decision-makers to a 
satisfactory solution, not an optimal or perfect one. In ML, heuristics are derived from the 
compilation of previous experiences that make up the algorithm’s general information base.  
Once a supervised learning program forms its heuristics, it can apply that 
understanding to new examples the machine has not seen before and emit a label for those 
 
32 Maini, V. (2018, May 28). Machine Learning for Humans, Part 2.1: Supervised Learning. Retrieved from 
https://medium.com/machine-learning-for-humans/supervised-learning-740383a2feab 
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new matches. The data presented in new examples can be a discrete or continuous value. If 
the data presented is a continuous value, meaning it can take any values, the system will parse 
it through a regression where the input is mapped to continuous output. Continuous, in this 
context, refers to the mathematical concept that between any two possible numbers there can 
always be another number. Between 6 and 7 is 6.5, between 6.5 and 6.6 is 6.55 and so on 
without exception. If the data presented is a discrete value, meaning it can take only a specific 
value, the system will parse it through classification where the input is mapped to output 
tags.33 Discrete values have specific numeric or non-numeric values such as 6 or “book.” There 
is no obvious way to merge, average, or combine these discrete categories because the values 
are independent points disconnected from each other.   
Unsupervised learning starts with unlabeled data and performs learning tasks that 
output clusters of items that are similar to each other in some mathematical sense. It does this 
without trying to attach a label or particular name to any of the output clusters of items. 
Depending on the purpose of a project, unsupervised learning can distinguish pattern 
structures from input data through clustering, dimensionality reduction, and representation 
learning.34 Clustering, a popular learning task in unsupervised learning, can group old and 
new data by similarity such that points in different clusters are dissimilar while points within 
a cluster are similar.35 Dimensionality reduction, another popular learning task in 
unsupervised learning, tries to reduce the complexity of the data while keeping as much of the 
relevant structure as possible.36  
 
33 Ibid, footnote 27. 
34 Ibid, footnote 27.  




The fundamental difference between supervised and unsupervised learning lies in the 
formation and understanding of the ground truth of the program. Unsupervised learning 
starts without a notion of ground truth and applies various mathematical techniques to draw 
patterns out in the data. The program bases its clusters off of a mathematical equation that it 
derives from inputs’ similarity. Supervised learning, on the other hand, starts with a notion of 
ground truth that it is taught through training data and finds patterns in the data based on its 
training. This type of program attaches specific labels to unknown sets of input based on the 
clusters of output. 
 
E. Neural Networks 
A popular data modeling structure underlying many ADS frameworks is neural 
networks. The concept of neural networks was first proposed in 1943 by Warren McCullough 
and Walter Pitts, two University of Chicago researchers, in their paper, A logical calculus of the 
ideas immanent in nervous activity.37 Research on neural networks followed the peaks and 
gullies that came with the AI winters of the 20th century but has enjoyed a massive resurgence 
recently thanks to the increased processing power of specialized graphics chips used for video 
on all modern computers.38 Neural networks have neurons, inspired by biological neurons, 
that represent mathematical functions. Originally, neural networks were an attempt to model 
the brain, but today with, developed understandings of the brain, it is clear that the brain and 
its neurons are more complicated and work differently than scientists initially thought.  
 
37 McCulloch, W.S., Pitts, W. A logical calculus of the ideas immanent in nervous activity. Bulletin of 
Mathematical Biophysics 5, 115–133 (1943). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02478259. 
38 Hardesty, Larry. “Explained: Neural Networks.” MIT News, MIT News Office, 14 Apr. 2017, 
news.mit.edu/2017/explained-neural-networks-deep-learning-0414. 
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The neural network can consist of millions of simple processing nodes that are densely 
interconnected and organized into layers of nodes that are ‘feed-forward,’ meaning the data 
fed into them moves through in only one direction.39 The neural network is organized into 
layers of these nodes with outputs from one layer connected to inputs of the next layer.40 An 
individual node can be connected to several nodes in the layer beneath it and above it, 
receiving data from nodes below it and sending data to the above nodes.41 When a network is 
active, a node can receive data, a different weighted number, over each of the connections 
beneath it. It then can multiply these numbers by the associated weight assigned to each of 
the incoming connections. After all the products of the incoming connections have been 
calculated, the node can add them together and determine if that calculated weight meets the 
threshold to send the weight up to its outgoing connections.   
On a more general level, each neuron in a neural network has a mathematical function 
that calculates a weighted sum of its inputs which is then fed into a complex non-linear 
function. This function passes data through successive layers until it arrives radically 
transformed at the output layer. The structure learns by starting with random values set for its 
weights and thresholds. It takes sample input or training data and adjusts its neurons’ weights 
based on the network’s performance on this data. The weights and thresholds are adjusted 
continuously until the example input consistently yields homogenous output. The adjustment 
of its neurons’ weights is a crucial component of a neural networks ability to learn, as the 
calculation of new weights is how the network improves itself. Thus, this component of neural 
networks is at the heart of modern advances in ML. 
 
39 Ibid. 
40 Lee, T. B. (2019, December 2). How neural networks work-and why they've become a big business. Retrieved 
from https://arstechnica.com/science/2019/12/how-neural-networks-work-and-why-theyve-become-a-big-
business/. 
41 Ibid, footnote 37. 
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3. FOURTH AMENDMENT HISTORY 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution was added as a part of the 
Bill of Rights on December 15, 1791, but its founding sentiments arose in the 1600s when 
colonists began reacting to Britain’s abuse of power. 17-century American Colonists were 
typically well-educated Englishmen aware of their rights as British citizens. These rights 
covered the maxim “Every man’s house is his castle” as demonstrated in Semayne’s case, 
argued in 1604 which established the notion of a search warrant.42 These assumed rights also 
included limits to executive power with respect to searches as revealed in Entick v Carrington 
(1765), a landmark case in UK constitutional law which decreased the scope of executive 
power and established civil liberties for the people.43 So, when colonists’ homes were invaded 
under oppressive “writs of assistance” they felt Britain was abusing its warrant power, and this 
motivated them to include protections from such violations in the Bill of Rights.44 
The Fourth Amendment states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.45 
 
42 Semayne’s Case All ER Rep 62 5 Co Rep 91 a Cro Eliz 908 Moore KB 668 Yelv 29 77 ER 194 
43 Entick v. Carrington (1765) 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029; 95 ER 807 
44 “In order to enforce the revenue laws, English authorities made use of writs of assistance, which were general 
warrants authorizing the bearer to enter any house or other place to search for and seize “prohibited and 
uncustomed” goods and commanding all subjects to assist in these endeavors. Once issued, the writs remained in 
force throughout the lifetime of the sovereign and six months thereafter. When, upon the death of George II in 
1760, the authorities were required to obtain the issuance of new writs, opposition was led by James Otis, who 
attacked such writs on libertarian grounds and who asserted the invalidity of the authorizing statutes because 
they conflicted with English constitutionalism.	Otis lost and the writs were issued and used, but his arguments 
were much cited in the colonies not only on the immediate subject but also with regard to judicial review.” 
“History.” Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School, www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-
conan/amendment-4/history.  
45 United States Constitution Amendment IV 
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This language addressed the colonist’ ultimate concern of protecting citizens’ privacy and 
safeguarding their freedom from unreasonable intrusions by the government. The scope of 
this amendment does not include protection from all searches and seizures, only searches and 
seizures that can be seen as an abuse of power by the government by not meeting the 
“probable cause” standard to the satisfaction of a neutral magistrate. This provision carries the 
original sentiments of the founders who were responding to direct government abuses of 
power and were not challenging the general grounds of government searches and seizures. 
Protected warrantless searches and seizures include instances where an officer asks for and is 
given consent to search, searches that are incident to a lawful arrest, probable cause, and 
exigent circumstances.46  
For a citizen’s Fourth Amendment right to have been violated, the citizen must prove 
that a justifiable expectation of privacy was arbitrarily violated by the government. Proving 
this arbitrary violation can be difficult when the violation arose from probable cause, a 
standard vague by design.  
 
A. Probable Cause 
One of the first definitions of probable cause was put forth by Chief Justice Marshall in 
United States v. Aaron Burr (1807): “I understand probable cause to be a case made out by proof 
furnishing good reason to believe that the crime alleged has been committed by the person 
charged with having committed it.”47 This early definition laid the groundwork for the idea 
that probable cause is inextricably linked with “good reason” or “reasonableness,” as the 
modern term encapsulating the iteration of this concept. However, after this early and still 
 
46 Kim, J. (Ed.). (2017, June). Fourth Amendment. Retrieved from 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fourth_amendment 
47 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 2, 1807 U.S. App. LEXIS 489 (Circuit Court, D. Virginia April 1, 1807).  
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vague definition, the Courts did not enforce probable cause under the Fourth amendment 
until about 150 years after their inception. The Bill of Rights stood as a formal declaration of 
federal rights and thus as held in Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833), the Bill of Rights only 
applied to the federal government, not the states.48 This position changed in the latter half of 
the 19th century when the Courts started interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment after its 
adoption in 1868.  
The Fourteenth Amendment was born out of concerns regarding citizenship rights 
and equal protection under the law as they related to former slaves following the Civil War. 
As one of the reconstruction amendments, the Fourteenth Amendment was monumental in 
broadening federal enforcement within state boundaries through the Due Process Clause and 
the Equal Protection Clause.	The Fourteenth Amendment states: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.49 
The Due Process Clause prohibited states and local governments from depriving persons of 
life, liberty, or property without a fair procedure.	The Equal Protection Clause required each 
state to provide equal protection under the law to all people, including all non-citizens, within 
 
48 Barron v. Baltimore., 32 U.S. 243, 8 L. Ed. 672, 1833 U.S. LEXIS 346 (Supreme Court of the United States 
February 16, 1833, Decided).  
49 United States Constitution Amendment XIV 
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its jurisdiction. The Supreme Court interpreted both of these clauses in conjunction with the 
entirety of the Fourteenth Amendment to incorporate most of the Bill of Rights as applicable 
legislation to be applied to the states as it is to the federal government. This new 
interpretation was reflected in Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad v. City of Chicago (1897) 
and in Gitlow v. New York (1925). Both cases applied Bill of Rights protections against the states 
and it was upheld.  
With this new legal precedent, the temperance movement helped institute one of the 
most notable broad reaching federal crimes due to the Eighteenth Amendment, by banning 
the production, transport, and sale of intoxicating liquors. Before the Prohibition Era, crimes 
were mainly contained at the state level. The Courts did not see many cases reach the federal 
level, and thus very few federal criminal offenses had been tried, so little case law existed. 
Nevertheless, prohibition ushered in a new era of jurisprudence with the difficulties of 
nationwide enforcement taking their toll on cities. To help enforce the Eighteenth 
Amendment, police officers leaned on the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause stipulation 
for help. Although prohibition formally ended in 1933, officers continued to use the probable 
cause stipulation to help enforce new liquor laws that arose.  
One of the landmark decisions that came out of this was Brinegar v. United States, 338 
U.S. 160 (1949). Brinegar had a reputation for illegally transporting liquor and drove past an 
officer parked on the highway with a vehicle that appeared ‘heavily loaded.’ The officer 
stopped Brinegar, alleged that he saw liquor in the front seat of the car although Brinegar 
denied this allegation, and arrested Brinegar, seizing all the alcohol in the vehicle as it was in 
violation of the Liquor Enforcement Act of 1936. Brinegar challenged his arrest under the 
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Fourth Amendment asserting the officer did not have a search warrant for the evidence used 
against him.  
The Court held that, “Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within 
the officers' knowledge, and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information, are 
sufficient in themselves to warrant a belief by a man of reasonable caution that a crime is 
being committed.”50 Thus the facts presented to the officers who pulled Brinegar over were 
sufficient to establish probable cause for the search and seizure hence they were admissible in 
the trial. This definition of probable cause aligns nicely with Chief Justice Marshall’s 1807 
definition making the substance for all explanations of probable cause a “reasonable” ground 
for belief of guilt, up until this point in legal history. 
B. Aguilar v. Texas 
Another landmark case shaping the probable cause definition came in 1964 when Nick 
Alford Aguilar’s home was searched for narcotics on a warrant that had been issued. The 
warrant was based on an affidavit stating that officers had received reliable information from 
a credible person.51 In Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) Justice Goldberg held: 
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is 
not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which 
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those 
 
50 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879, 1949 U.S. LEXIS 2084 (Supreme Court of the 
United States June 27, 1949, Decided).  
51 Aguilar v. Tex., 378 U.S. 108, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723, 1964 U.S. LEXIS 994 (Supreme Court of the United 
States June 15, 1964, Decided).  
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inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by 
the officer engaged in the often-competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.52  
Justice Goldberg is keen to highlight that the process of getting a warrant approved by a judge 
is embedded into the Fourth Amendment as a safeguard for maintaining the integrity of the 
investigative process. This distinction forces the warrant process to be subject to objective 
review by an entity not directly involved with the criminal proceeding, which preserves the 
founding vision of the Fourth Amendment as a mechanism to stifle government abuse of 
power. However, in the case of probable cause, which stands as an exception to this safeguard, 
reasonableness stands at the center of determining whether the search was justified. If an 
officer determines they have probable cause to search a petitioner, and the petitioner later 
files to suppress based on this officer’s probable cause determination, the judge presiding over 
the case will assess the reasonableness of the officer’s probable cause claim, bearing in mind 
an officer’s ability to abuse the governmental power inherent within their job. 
Justice Goldberg understood this reasonableness requirement to establish probable 
cause and expanded upon this definition by detailing what information can provide the 
reliability needed to affirm reasonableness. He explains: 
Although an affidavit supporting a search warrant may be based on hearsay 
information and need not reflect the direct personal observations of the affiant, the 
magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the 
informant concludes that contraband, such as narcotics, is where he claims it is, and 




informant, whose identity need not be disclosed, is credible or his information 
reliable.53  
Thus, officers must produce some sort of evidence or documentation that the information an 
informant is providing is reliable. The form of evidence may vary dependent on the case’s 
specific factual background, but the essence of the evidence must be substantial enough to 
convince a reasonable person that a crime is being committed where their information 
suggests. 
This holding established a legal guideline for evaluating the validity of probable cause: 
the magistrate must know why an informant is credible and on what underlying 
circumstances this reliable informant relied on when providing the information. The added 
layer of consideration this holding provided to the reasonableness standard that already 
existed for probable cause determinations is significant when determining the reliability of 
ADS to establish probable cause. Through understanding the dubious black box 
infrastructure of many ADS, can the resulting output be considered a reliable informant 
under this standard?54  
C. Spinelli v. United States 
In Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), the courts added another level of 
consideration to the judicial guideline created in Aguilar by introducing a “sufficiency” 
component to an officer’s affidavit explanation. Similar to Aguilar, William Spinelli was 
suspected to be partaking in criminal activity, illegal interstate gambling, and evidence 
 
53 Ibid. 
54 The concept of black box infrastructure will be defined infra in the Black Box Properties section. Reference 
Black Box Properties section.  
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uncovered by a warranted FBI search was used against him in trial. The affidavit that 
authorized the FBI’s search warrant was informed by a confidential reliable informant.  
Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the Court which held “the informant’s tip, an 
essential part of the affidavit in this case, was not sufficient (even as corroborated by other 
allegations) to provide the basis for a finding of probable cause that a crime was being 
committed.”55 He supported this holding, stating: 
The tip was inadequate under the standard of Aguilar, supra, since it did not set forth 
any reason to support the conclusion that the informant was ‘reliable,’ and did not 
sufficiently state the underlying circumstances from which the informant had 
concluded that petitioner was running a bookmaking operation or sufficiently detail 
his activities to enable the Commissioner to know that he was relying on more than 
causal rumor or general reputation.56  
Spinelli’s case raised the question of how to handle insufficient justification provided in an 
affidavit, particularly concerning when the information is fully or partially corroborated by 
independent sources. In Spinelli’s case, the affidavit did not give any explanation for why the 
tip should be considered reliable. It merely corroborated other allegations, and thus the judge 
had no reason to believe the evidence because it could not pass the Aguilar requirement on its 
own.57   
 
55 Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S. Ct. 584, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637, 1969 U.S. LEXIS 2701 (Supreme Court of the 
United States January 27, 1969, Decided).  
56 DRAPER v. UNITED STATES, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S. Ct. 329, 3 L. Ed. 2d 327, 1959 U.S. LEXIS 1607 (Supreme Court 
of the United States January 26, 1959, Decided).  
57  Ibid, footnote 45.  
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The Spinelli holding added to the Aguilar requirement by taking the judicial standard a 
step further and requiring the magistrate to understand how the informant concluded that a 
crime had been committed. This development created a two-pronged test known as the 
Aguilar-Spinelli test which basically established an explainability requirement to satisfy 
probable cause. This is significant when determining the reliability of ADS to establish 
probable cause under the Aguilar-Spinelli judicial guideline because if ADS cannot explain in 
an intelligible way how it produced a given output, how would the output suffice under this 
standard?  
D. Ybarra v. Illinois 
After Spinelli, Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979) extended the judicial guideline for 
establishing probable cause to include an individualized suspicion requirement, such that 
officers must have a particularized belief with respect to the person to be searched or seized. 
Ventura Ybarra was in a tavern where police obtained a search warrant to look for evidence of 
possession of controlled substances. The officers decided once in the tavern that they would 
search all patrons present, and upon frisking Mr. Ybarra, officers felt a cigarette pack that 
ended up containing heroin. The officers charged Mr. Ybarra with unlawful possession of a 
controlled substance and Mr. Ybarra challenged his conviction.  
Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the court holding: 
Even though police possess a warrant based on probable cause to search a location in 
which a person happens to be at the time the warrant was executed, a person's mere 
propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without 
more, give rise to probable cause to search that person. Where the standard is 
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probable cause, a search or seizure of a person must be supported by probable cause 
particularized with respect to that person. This requirement cannot be undercut or 
avoided by simply pointing to the fact that coincidentally there exists probable cause 
to search or seize another or to search the premises where the person may happen to 
be.58  
This particularization requirement added another layer of depth onto the probable cause 
definition by requiring individualized suspicion. Ric Simmons, the Chief Justice Thomas J. 
Moyer Professor for the Administration of Justice and the Rule of Law at Moritz College of 
Law at the Ohio State University, describes this particularity requirement as “not merely a 
statistical likelihood that a suspect is guilty based on his membership in a certain group, but a 
reference to particular characteristics or actions by the suspect that shows that he specifically 
is likely to be guilty.”59 “Demographic probabilities” as Arnold H. Loewy, the Judge George R. 
Killman Jr. Chair of Criminal Law at the Texas Tech School of Law, calls it “are insufficient to 
create probable cause or reasonable suspicion; the police must also notice something specific 
to the defendant to create the probability as to him.’”60 The presence of additional factors that 
are specific to what the suspect does in terms of the case, not who the suspect is, becomes a 
critically important concept for establishing probable cause under the Fourth Amendment. 
This is significant when determining the ability of ADS to establish probable cause under the 
particularized suspicion requirement of the Fourth Amendment because if ADS is 
 
58 Ybarra v. Ill., 444 U.S. 85, 100 S. Ct. 338, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238, 1979 U.S. LEXIS 151 (Supreme Court of the United States 
November 28, 1979, Decided).  
59 Simmons, Ric, Quantifying Criminal Procedure: How to Unlock the Potential of Big Data in Our Criminal 
Justice System (July 29, 2016). 2016 Mich. St. L. Rev. 947 (2016); Ohio State Public Law Working Paper No. 362. 
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2816006 
60 Arnold H. Loewy, Rethinking Search and Seizure in a Post-9/11 World, 80 MISS. L.J. 1507, 1518 (2011) 
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fundamentally based on generalized statistical probabilities and likelihoods, how could its 
output satisfy this standard?  
 
E. Illinois v. Gates 
By 1979, the probable cause standard encompassed a reasonable, explainable, and 
individualized ground for an individual to believe that another person was guilty of some 
crime. However, Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) reassessed this standard by taking a closer 
look at the rigid two-pronged test instituted after Aguilar and Spinelli. The Bloomingdale, 
Illinois Police Department received an anonymous letter that alleged Lance and Susan Gates 
were trafficking drugs. The letter stated when the drugs were being moved, how they were 
being moved, and where the Gates kept the drugs, among other things. Police officers acted on 
the anonymous letter’s tips and confirmed the drug trafficking allegations.  
A search warrant was obtained based on the Bloomingdale police officer’s affidavit 
which included a copy of the anonymous letter. Officers searched the Gateses’ home and 
automobile to find the drugs and other contrabands. Prior to the trial, the Gateses moved to 
suppress evidence seized during the search, and the trial court approved, ordering the 
suppression of all items seized. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed this decision on the 
holding that the anonymous letter and affidavit were inadequate to sustain a determination of 
probable cause for issuance of a search warrant under Aguilar and Spinelli since they failed the 
two-pronged test.61 The anonymous letter failed the test because it “provides virtually nothing 
 
61 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 1983 U.S. LEXIS 54, 51 U.S.L.W. 4709 (Supreme 
Court of the United States June 8, 1983, Decided).  
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from which one might conclude that its author is either honest or his information is reliable 
[and] gives absolutely no indication of the basis for the writers’ predictions regarding the 
Gateses’ criminal activities.”62  
After receiving briefs and hearing oral arguments regarding the questionable validity 
of the Bloomingdale Police’s search warrant, Justice William Rehnquist delivered the decision 
of the Supreme Court in favor of the State of Illinois. Justice Rehnquist questioned: 
Whether the rule requiring the exclusion at a criminal trial of evidence obtained in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment, should to any extent be modified, so as, for 
example, not to require the exclusion of evidence obtained in the reasonable belief 
that the search and seizure at issue was consistent with the Fourth Amendment.63  
This line of questioning lead to the decision to overturn the rigid two-pronged test established 
under Aguilar and Spinelli in favor of the more flexible “totality of circumstances” approach. 
This approach placed significant value on independent police work that corroborated details 
of an informant’s tip, thus shifting the probable cause standard to a “fair probability” on 
which a reasonable and prudent person would act.  
The adjusted standard to establish probable cause under the Fourth Amendment 
created in Gates reflects a shifting affinity towards considering reasonable intuition. A 
qualitative legal standard such as “fair probability” allows judges to account for facts missing 
in police affidavits instinctively. Under this definition, probable cause means, after assessing 





contraband or evidence of a crime will be found if searched. The judicial privilege of 
accounting for missing facts intuitively is important for establishing probable cause under the 
Fourth Amendment because it values human instinctive feeling over conscious intelligent 
reasoning when determining probable cause. This is significant when determining the 
capability of ADS to establish probable cause under the totality of circumstances approach 
because, if ADS can only simulate conscious intelligent reasoning and not human instinctive 
feeling, how could its output fulfill this approach? 
F. Ornelas v. United States 
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996), similar to Gates, brought up another new 
perspective that compelled an introspective look at the then current probable cause 
definition. Detective Michael Pautz of the Milwaukee County Sheriff’s Department noticed a 
car with California license plates in a motel parking lot. He recognized the car as a popular 
model for drug couriers because it was easy to hide drugs within the interior and noted that 
California was a “source state” for drugs. He radioed his dispatcher to inquire about the car’s 
owner and was informed the car was registered under either Miguel Ledesma Ornelas or 
Miguel Ornelas Ledesma.  
Upon checking the motel registry, Detective Pautz discovered that an Ismael Ornelas 
accompanied by a second man checked into the motel with no reservations. He called his 
partner, Detective Donald Hurrle, who came to the scene to assist Detective Pautz. Together 
they contacted the local office of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and asked 
them to run Ismael and Miguel Ornelas names through the Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs 
Information System (NADDIS), which is a federal database of known and suspected drug 
traffickers. Both names appeared in the databases confirming Miguel and Ismael were drug 
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dealers. The officers then summoned Deputy Luedke and the department’s drug-sniffing dog, 
to the scene to replace Detective Pautz.  
Detective Hurrle and Deputy Luedke waited at the scene until the petitioners emerged 
from the motel and got in the car that Detective Pautz had originally noticed. Detective Hurrle 
and Deputy Luedke approached the car and asked if the petitioners had any illegal drugs or 
contraband in their possession to which the petitioners answered no. Detective Hurrle asked 
for identification and was given two California drivers licenses identifying the petitioners as 
Saul Ornelas and Ismael Ornelas-Ledesma. After confirming their identities Detective Hurrle 
asked if he could search the car and the petitioners consented. Deputy Luedke noticed a panel 
above the right rear passenger armrest had a screw that was rusty, which indicated to him that 
it had been removed at some time. He dismantled the panel and discovered drugs, prompting 
an arrest of the petitioners.  
The petitioners filed pretrial motions to suppress the evidence found during the search 
alleging the officers violated the petitioners’ Fourth Amendment rights by conducting the 
search without a warrant and detaining them in the parking lot. Chief Justice Rehnquist 
upheld the magistrate’s ruling, which acknowledged the consent given by the petitioners to 
search the car did not authorize the officers to search inside the panel under Seventh Circuit 
precedent. They also acknowledged that when the officers approached the petitioner’s car, a 
reasonable person would not have felt free to leave the scene, so the statement of consent 
could be considered coerced, and the encounter is considered an investigatory stop. 
Investigatory stops are permissible under the Fourth Amendment if they are predicated by 
reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle, and probable cause to perform a subsequent 
warrantless search of the vehicle. Therefore, for the warrantless search to be legal in the 
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absence of valid consent, a neutral magistrate must support an officer’s claims to reasonable 
suspicion and probable cause.  
In arriving at this holding, Justice Rehnquist explains the court’s standard for 
reasonable suspicion and probable cause by stating: 
 articulating precisely what ‘reasonable suspicion’ and ‘probable cause’ mean is not 
possible. They are commonsense, nontechnical conceptions that deal with the factual 
and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, 
not legal technicians, act… The principal components of a determination of reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause [for investigatory stops and warrantless car searches] will 
be the events which occurred leading up to the stop or search, and then the decision 
whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable 
police officer, amount to reasonable suspicion or to probable cause.64 
This standard follows the totality of circumstances approach which takes all-things-
considered into a determination of probable cause from the perspective of an objectively 
reasonable police officer. Police officers are subjected to many variations of crimes in their 
line of work that allow them to look at the historical facts of an incident and infer varying 
levels of guilt from their experience. This inference from experience allows officers to operate 
within a similar framework that is used in the judicial branch of government, as judges rule 
based on precedents set in previous cases in order to maintain fair application of the law 
among all petitioners. 
 
64 Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 3391, 64 U.S.L.W. 4373, 96 
Cal. Daily Op. Service 3744, 96 Daily Journal DAR 6059, 9 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 617 (Supreme Court of the United 
States May 28, 1996, Decided ).  
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In this case the factual background that informed the police officer’s inference to 
decide whether probable cause existed was the NADDIS data, the model of the car, the 
issuing state of the license plate, the location of incident, the time of year, the nature of the 
motel check-in, the body language of the suspect, and finally the loose car door panel. The 
confluence of these factors created the context under which a reasonable police officer could 
draw an inference of guilt based on their experience in such a line of work, whereas a layman 
could view the confluence as mere coincidence and the loose panel as general automotive 
wear and tear that comes with time. This is significant when determining the capability of 
ADS to establish probable cause under the totality of circumstances approach because, if ADS 
was given the same factual background to establish the necessary case-specific context, would 
it be able to make a reasonable police officer inference, or would it fall short and view the 
scene with a layman’s perspective? 
G. Florida v. Harris 
Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237 (2013) was another case that compelled an introspective 
look at the then current probable cause understanding with specific regard to who or what 
can influence probable cause. The case centered on the reliability of a narcotics dog during a 
routine traffic stop. Officer Wheetley pulled over Clayton Harris for a routine traffic stop, 
prompted by an expired license plate, when he noticed an open beer can and Harris’s nervous 
demeanor. This prompted Officer Wheetley to ask Harris’s consent to search the vehicle to 
which Harris refused. Officer Wheetley proceeded to execute a “free air sniff” test with Aldo, 
his narcotics trained dog, who alerted at the driver’s-side door handle. Aldo’s alert led Officer 
Wheetley to conclude he had probable cause to search Harris’s vehicle, which turned out not 
to contain any of the substances Aldo was trained to detect. However, Officer Wheetley did 
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find ingredients for manufacturing methamphetamine and arrested Harris on illegal 
possession of those ingredients. Harris was released on bail and in a subsequent stop, 
prompted by a broken brake light, was administered another “free air sniff” test by Aldo. Aldo 
again alerted at the driver’s-side door handle but nothing of interest was found this time. 
In Harris’s suppression hearing, his attorney focused on Aldo’s performance in the 
field rather than Aldo’s extensive drug detection training and its respective merit. The trial 
court denied Harris’s motion to suppress the evidence on the grounds they believed the 
officer had probable cause, but the Florida Supreme Court (FSC) reversed the decision and 
held that in every case the officer must present an exhaustive set of records outlining the dog’s 
reliability, specifically the dogs field performance records. Without the dog’s field 
performance records, the FSC held that an officer would be unable to establish probable 
cause to search the vehicle. This holding is the antithesis of the totality-of-the-circumstances 
approach and is inconsistent with the “flexible, common-sense standard” of probable cause 
previously established by the Supreme Court of the United States, thus the ruling of the FSC 
was reversed. 
The FSC held, “[W]hen a dog alerts, the fact that the dog has been trained and certified 
is simply not enough to establish probable cause.”65  To prove a dog's reliability, the FSC 
believed that more supporting evidence needed to be produced such as: 
the dog's training and certification records, an explanation of the meaning of the 
particular training and certification, field performance records (including any 
unverified alerts), and evidence	concerning the experience and training of the officer 
 
65 Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 185 L. Ed. 2d 61, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 1121, 81 U.S.L.W. 4081, 24 Fla. L. 
Weekly Fed. S 18 (Supreme Court of the United States February 19, 2013, Decided).  
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handling the dog, as well as any other objective evidence known to the officer about 
the dog's reliability.66	 
The FSC continued by stressing the need for “evidence of the dog's performance history,” 
including documentation revealing “how often the dog has alerted in the field without illegal 
contraband having been found.”67	False positives, as believed by the FSC, could help to 
expose dangerous confounding factors that influence a drug detection dog’s ability to 
accurately do its job and thus problematizes its reliability.  
Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Supreme Court of the United 
States in which it disagreed with the FSC’s holding based on the rigid evidentiary checklist it 
required to establish probable cause. She notes that “an alert cannot establish probable cause 
under the Florida court's decision unless the State introduces comprehensive documentation 
of the dog's prior ‘hits’ and ‘misses’ in the field.” Justice Kagan contests this notion on the 
precedent established in previous cases where a gap in factual background for establishing 
probable cause can be compensated for by other strong indicators of reliability. She continues 
by refuting the false positives argument presented by the FSC by introducing the concept of 
false negatives that would be impossible to capture in field data. False negatives could be if a 
dog failed to alert to a car containing drugs, if a dog alerts for a spot where drugs were 
previously held in a car that still has residual odor, or if a dog alerts to a car containing drugs 
but the officer cannot find them and thus deems there are no drugs in the car, among other 
things. Through this Justice Kagan demonstrates how standard training in controlled 





are limited. This is all to say a flexible all-things-considered approach to probable cause is 
best and remains the best approach because it gives police and magistrates proper discretion 
to do their job without bureaucratic handicaps.  
Moreover, Justice Kagan added that, “a defendant must have an opportunity to 
challenge such evidence of a dog's reliability, whether by cross-examining the testifying 
officer or by introducing his own fact or expert witnesses” and they “may contest training or 
testing standards as flawed or too lax, or raise an issue regarding the particular alert.”68 If all 
these facts viewed by a reasonably prudent person would lead them to conclude that a search 
would uncover evidence of a crime, then probable cause can be established. This is significant 
when determining the capability of ADS to establish probable cause under the flexible all-
things-considered approach because, if a defendant has the right to interrogate ADS 
reliability, how would it go about such a task considering the technical limitations of current 
technology?69 
H. Explainability 
From the signing of the Bill of Rights to the 21st century, the probable cause definition 
has grown, shifted and adjusted to the changing times. Brinegar determined probable cause to 
be a reasonable ground for belief of guilt. Aguilar and Spinelli expanded this to include 
explainability, making the standard for establishing probable cause include an explanation of 
the reasonable ground for belief of guilt under their two-pronged test. Ybarra went a step 
 
68 Ibid. The courts are divided on whether or not defendants should have the right to evaluate source code 
independently. It is a legal issue currently being debated. See this paper for more discussion on the topic. Steven 
M. Bellovin, Matt Blaze, Susan Landau, and Brian Owsley. Seeking the source: Criminal defendants' 
constitutional right to source code. Ohio State Technology Law Journal, 17(1), December 2020. To appear. 
69 Limitations of current technology will be discussed infra in the Limitations of Technical Approaches section. 
References Limitations of Technical Approaches section. 
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further and added an individualized suspicion requirement. Then, Gates took a step back and 
reexamined the probable cause definition, abandoning the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test 
for the totality-of-circumstances approach that required a fair probability on which a 
reasonable and prudent person would act to establish probable cause. Ornelas followed suit 
with the totality-of-circumstances approach taking all-things-considered into its 
determination of probable cause. Harris rounded the probable cause definition out by 
encapsulating it in a flexible all-things-considered approach while introducing nuanced 
factors into the equation.  
Together these cases reveal that at the heart of probable cause determinations is the 
idea of a rational agent explaining why a belief of guilt is reasonable. Explainability is a core 
function of our legal system intrinsic to its operations, exhibited through the structure of our 
courts having petitioners explain to the judge what happened, attorneys explaining to juries 
their positions, and judges explaining to petitioners why the outcome of their cases resulted in 
their innocence or guilt.  In terms of determinations of probable cause, a rational agent’s 
ability to explain the question of why persuasively to another rational agent is the key element 
in the determination that probable cause exists. The explanation must be sophisticated 
enough to convince another person that the determination is correct but reasonable enough 
that the other person can understand the rationale. If an individual comes up with a 
sophisticated explanation that stems from an advanced understanding of a given truth, but 
others cannot understand this sophisticated explanation, can this individual’s explanation be 
validated as true? If an explanation is so complicated that only a specialist can understand the 
rationale, is this explanation considered permissible?  
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Considering a defendant must be convicted by a jury of his peers and not specialists, 
accessibility is an essential component of the explainability standards upheld in the courts. 
Our trial by jury system demonstrates accessibility as an embedded value of explainability in 
our legal system. Explanations that are accessible to a common man and a specialist alike are 
the standard by which they can constitute probable cause. 
 
4. LIMITATIONS OF TECHNICAL APPROACHES 
Despite all the recent groundbreaking innovations in AI research and computer 
science, there are still significant limitations that handicap the legal system’s ability to trust 
ADS wholeheartedly. Foremost among them is a failure to meet the explainability standard 
required to establish probable cause. ML models, beneath all the advanced programming, are 
simply instantiations of a predetermined policy. In light of recent efforts to solve this 
predetermined policy problem, ADS remain error-ridden when faced with edge cases and 
complexity beyond what the model was designed to tackle.  
Take satire as an illustrative example of an edge case with which an algorithm might 
be faced. Twitter could have an ML algorithm that scans its feeds for propaganda. It comes 
across an article entitled ‘CIA’s Facebook’ Program Dramatically Cut Agency’s Costs.’70 
Without the proper context, the algorithm could label this piece as propaganda because it 
knows Facebook is a technology company, not a CIA program, and thus the article is making a 
false claim. However, what it misses is the nuanced satirical nature of the piece, criticizing 
Facebook’s invasive practices that violate an individual’s privacy.  ML cannot distinguish 
 
70 “CIA's 'Facebook' Program Dramatically Cut Agency's Costs.” The Onion, The Onion, 18 Oct. 2017, 
www.theonion.com/cias-facebook-program-dramatically-cut-agencys-costs-1819594988. 
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complex and nuanced human concepts such as satire and irony from propaganda and hatred 
because algorithms lack perspective. These concepts do not fit nicely within the puzzled 
pattern of human life, meaning they do not follow rigid rules. Rather, they are fluid ideas that 
change based on the person using or viewing them. Individuals can disagree on where the 
boundary lies between categorizing a piece of work as propaganda or satire, making confusion 
an endemic part of these concepts’ construction. Thus, if humans can be confused by such 
concepts, coding algorithms with predetermined policies to detect these concepts is a difficult 
task. 
This illustrative example highlights ADS’ core operational scheme which is designed 
to find the fact patterns upon which they were trained to act. When straightforward fact 
patterns ADS were trained to find exist, ADS work wonderfully. However, when a fact pattern 
does not exist or is hard to determine, ADS are horribly conservative, sticking to their pattern 
despite potential erroneous output. In these instances, the algorithm must fill in its knowledge 
gap by generalizing between the policy implied by its training data and the new case. The 
systems are designed to be accurate, not creative, so they struggle when new vectors that they 
were not trained on are presented. This lack of creativity stunts their ability to be dynamic 
when faced with changing circumstances that produce novel fact patterns. Change implies 
there is no pattern to be detected, and thus the systems fail to do their jobs in this instance.  
This pattern-centric approach taken by ADS reduces the value of each individual piece 
of data down to binary categorizations. ADS can find a pattern, but they cannot determine 
whether the pattern is a good pattern or a bad pattern and how the pattern can affect real 
people that are represented by the data points. ADS and systems analogous to it have no way 
of assigning notions of right and wrong to patterns; these notions have to be taught. Teaching 
systems to understand concepts of right and wrong is a difficult task when there is no absolute 
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consensus on what differentiates something as right as opposed to being wrong. These 
notions lay on an evolving spectrum of understanding, hence teaching ADS to patternize this 
understanding is next to impossible.   
 
A. Black Box Properties 
Although we can understand how ADS form patterns, ADS still lack explainability. In 
many cases, they cannot explain to users how they determined one piece of input fit into one 
pattern as opposed to another piece of input that did not fit into the same pattern. This lack of 
explainability is attributed to a property of its design known in the computer science world as 
the Black Box problem. The Black Box problem touches all types and styles of ADS in some 
form, taking on different properties in each iteration. The problem describes the void between 
human understanding of machine algorithms and algorithm functionality.  
Yavar Bathaee, a litigator at Bathaee Dunne Limited Liability Partnership (LLP.) and a 
self-proclaimed AI enthusiast, eloquently defines the Black Box problem “as an inability to 
fully understand an AI’s decision-making process and the inability to predict the AI’s 
decisions or outputs.”71 He divides the problem into two parts, Strong Black Boxes and Weak 
Black Boxes. “Strong black boxes,” as he calls them, “are AI with decision-making processes 
that are entirely opaque to humans. There is no way to determine how the AI arrived at a 
decision, what information is outcome determinative to the AI, or to obtain a ranking of the 
variables processed by the AI in the order of their importance. This form of black box cannot 
be analyzed ex post by reverse engineering the AI’s outputs.”72 Weak Black Boxes, on the 
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other hand, are also opaque to humans but can be reverse engineered or probed to determine 
a loose ranking of the importance of the variables the AI takes into account.73 “This in turn 
may allow a limited and imprecise ability to predict how the model will make its decisions.”74  
Both types of Black Boxes have the capability of functioning outside the creators’ 
initial goals in ways the creators are not able to understand or predict. The lack of 
transparency generated by ADS’ Black Box feature is referred to as a system’s complexity. 
Depending on the problem, an engineer is trying to solve, the complexity of an algorithm can 
get incredibly dense. Coupled with all the advancements in ADS that are allowing for 
computational power beyond what was previously comprehensible, the Black Box problem of 
ADS is only growing. The Black Box problem helps explain why ADS output cannot establish 
probable cause under the Fourth Amendment because the lack of transparency generated 
within these systems cannot meet the explainability requirement needed for probable cause. 
ADS algorithms rely on geometric relationships that humans struggle to visualize; thus, 
human audits cannot understand the machine’s decision-making process and therefore 
render the output inexplainable. 
 
B. Adversarial Machine Learning 
 Due to ADS’s Black Box nature, figuring out why a system decided to categorize a data 
point in one way as opposed to another can be difficult. But, coders smart enough to reverse 
engineer the decision process and understand the machine’s decision can manipulate the 





works similar to an optical illusion where coders can intentionally design an input that forces 
the model to make a mistake.75   
 A famous adversarial example is described in a 2015 paper published at the 
International Conference on Learning Representations entitled, Explaining and Harnessing 
Adversarial Examples. 76 Google researchers Ian Goodfellow, Jonathon Shlens and Christian 
Szegedy, began with an image of a panda. By adding an imperceptibly small change to the 
panda image they were able to change the panda image’s classification to gibbon with high 
confidence. To the human eye the image was still clearly a panda, but to the machine, the 
image was best classified as a gibbon. Because the machine cannot articulate what made it 
reclassify the panda to a gibbon, nor can it consider why this question matters, the machine 
makes this judgment presuming it is correct although a human would know otherwise. In this 
benign example it is easy to miss the significance of this flaw, but when considered in terms of 
an autonomous car who misidentifies a stop sign and speeds through a busy intersection, the 
significance of this flaw is magnified.77  
Adversarial examples illustrate important limitations of ADS, revealing how they can 
be unknowingly fooled and thus vulnerable to miscalculations. Small imperceptible 
difference makes ADS unreliable because it is hard for human audits to understand why the 
system changed its classification when no change is visible to the human eye. There is an 
incommensurability between the way in which the human brain and ADS interpret the world, 
which allows for adversarial flaws. Therefore, in a legal sense, machine statements of 
 
75 Goodfellow, I. (2019, March 7). Attacking Machine Learning with Adversarial Examples. Retrieved from 
https://openai.com/blog/adversarial-example-research/ 
76 Goodfellow, I. J., Shlens, J., & Szegedy, C. (2015). Explaining And Harnessing Adversarial Examples. Google Inc. 
Retrieved from https://arxiv.org/pdf/1412.6572.pdf 
77 Eykholt, K., Evtimov, I., Fernande, E., Li, B., Rahmati, A., Xiao, C., … Song, D. (2018). Robust Physical-World 
Attacks on Deep Learning Visual Classification. CVPR. 
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probable cause can produce inaccurate determinations because their interpretation of the 
world is vastly different from that of humans.  
 
C. Bad Classifiers 
Another limitation of ADS is the possibility for bad classifiers in ML algorithms. 
Classifiers, in this case, refer to the mathematical function that maps input data to a category. 
Bad classifiers thus map undesirable correlations that are difficult to detect. In a contrived 
example produced by a 2016 paper, ‘Why Should I Trust You?’: Explaining the Predictions of Any 
Classifier, Marco Tuli Riberiro, Carlos Guestrin, and Sameer Singh, all researchers with 
connections to the University of Washington, hand-selected twenty images of wolves and 
huskies to train a model.78 The training images of wolves all deliberately had snow in the 
background while the husky images did not. An additional sixty images were given to the 
system and the classifier predicted wolf if there was snow or a light background at the bottom 
and husky otherwise regardless of animal color, position, pose, etc.79 This bad classifier 
delineated snow and light backgrounds as the distinguishing factor to determine whether the 
image was a husky or a wolf. 
Any human observer would know that a wolf is not a wolf because of its environment. 
Rather, a wolf is a wolf because of its physical characteristics, anatomy, and other specific 
traits unique to the wolf species. A husky similarly is a husky because it has husky physical 
characteristics, anatomy, and other specific traits unique to the dog species. A human 
observer would also know that a husky can be found in wintery environments, so making that 
the distinguishing classifier would be a bad classification.  
 
78 Ribeiro, M. T., Singh, S., & Guestrin, C. (n.d.). “Why Should I Trust You?” Explaining the Predictions of Any 
Classifier. Retrieved from https://www.kdd.org/kdd2016/papers/files/rfp0573-ribeiroA.pdf. 
79 Ibid, footnote 64.  
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Although this example was explainable, the room for how nuanced machine thinking 
can be with bad classifiers is a vulnerable limitation of ADS. Such poor classification metrics 
speak to ADS’s capability to optimize for wrong utility functions that, in complex systems, 
would be opaque to humans and can result in harm. Since ADS cannot determine whether 
they are using a bad classifier or not in their computing the system’s output would not be able 
to constitute probable cause.  
 
D. Proxy Variables 
Similar to bad classifiers, proxy variables, as a technical limitation, prove to be a 
substantiable legal restriction on ADS’s capability to establish probable cause because they 
are discriminatory in effect. Proxy variables are variables that have a close correlation to the 
goal of the program but inherently represent something unrelated and often discriminatory. 
They arise from confounding variables that can produce anomalous correlations and thus 
faulty output. Confounding variables can be anything such as race or age that are not directly 
inputted into the system but are accounted for through proxy variables such as zip code or 
credit score, making the output legally discriminatory and accordingly impermissible in a 
court of law.  
Algorithms are very good at discovering proxy variables, although they are not the first 
to use them for discriminatory practices. Take qualified voters in America throughout 
fluctuating historical time periods for a perfect example of proxy variables discriminating 
against marginalized populations. The Constitution does not definitively spell out who is 
eligible to vote. Over time four amendments have been passed prohibiting the 
disenfranchisement of certain marginalized demographics. The Fifteenth Amendment, 
ratified in 1870, prohibited the disenfranchisement of citizens “on the account of race, color, or 
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previous condition of servitude.”80 The Nineteenth Amendment, ratified in 1920, prohibited 
disenfranchisement of citizens “on the account of sex.”81 The Twenty-Fourth Amendment, 
ratified in 1964, abolished the poll tax qualification for Federal Elections.82 Finally, the 
Twenty-Sixth Amendment, ratified in 1971, prohibited the disenfranchisement of citizens on 
the account of age, setting the minimum age to 18 years old.83 Aside from these federal 
prohibitions the rest was largely left up to the States. The States leveraged proxy variables 
such as property ownership, religious tests, free status, poll taxes, literacy tests, and recently 
incarceration as means to keep marginalized populations from voting and maintain 
disenfranchisement in their elections. Although none of these qualifications directly related to 
discriminatory categories, because of institutional inequalities and systematic racism these 
qualifications correlated exceedingly well with race, ethnicity, age, and gender, among other 
protected categories. Thus, the implications of these proxy variables had discriminatory 
effects.  
Outside of voting the practice of redlining encompassed a number of proxy variables 
that correlated exceedingly well with minorities and had discriminatory implications on their 
communities.  Redlining is the process of systematically denying various public and private 
services to residents of specific neighborhoods through raising prices. Services such as 
banking, insurance, mortgages, health care, or even retail businesses are denied to residents 
because their neighborhoods are deemed ‘riskier’ than similar neighborhoods of different 
racial compositions, and thus prices in their neighborhood for service providers are higher. 
Bill Dedman, an investigative journalist for Newsday, won the Pulitzer Prize for his series of 
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82 United States Constitution Amendment XXIV 
83 United States Constitution Amendment XXVI 
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articles, The Color of Money, where he divulges how banks and other mortgage lenders in 
Atlanta were discriminating against black neighborhoods. Despite giving loans to the poorest 
white neighborhoods in Atlanta, Dedman discovered that many banks and other mortgage 
lenders did not lend in middle-class or more affluent black neighborhoods. He explained how 
the banks made use of proxy variables such as:  
… poor quality housing and lack of home sales in black neighborhoods, fewer 
applications from blacks, and limitations in the federal lending data… real estate 
agents, appraisers, federal loan programs… banking officials said they would make 
more loans to blacks if real estate agents sent them more black applicants. Real estate 
brokers who work in black neighborhoods confirmed that they often don't send black 
homebuyers to banks or savings and loans, but said that is because those institutions 
have not been responsive and do not solicit their business.84 
Dedman’s discovery of proxy variables leveraged by many banks and other mortgage lenders 
in Atlanta revealed a cyclical feedback loop that continuously excluded black neighborhoods 
from further development and thus perpetuated a toxic brand of racism. Similar to 
exclusionary voting qualifications, although none of the bank’s lending factors directly related 
to race, institutional inequalities and systematic racism correlated these factors exceedingly 
well with attributes of being non-white. Thus, the implications of these proxy variables had 
discriminatory effects. 
 Both exclusionary voting qualifications and discriminatory redlining reveal how proxy 
variables have been embedded in public policy long before computer algorithmic polices 
started shining interrogative spotlights on them. ADS had nothing to do with proxy variables 
 
84 Dedman, Bill. “Atlanta Blacks Losing in Home Loans Scramble: Banks Favor White Areas by 5-1 Margin.” The 
Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 1 May 1988. The Color of Money, http://powerreporting.com/color/1a.html. 
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used in the Jim Crow South or in the banks of redlined Atlanta, yet they were still there. This 
phenomenon is a call to look introspectively and retrospectively at our society to understand 
that bias is not something ADS created. However, it is something ADS encodes. Although 
societal and political norms concerning fairness have progressed over the natural course of 
human history, the evolution of these norms should not be conflated with their erasure.  
Bias is endemic to every known community. People make decisions on what is or is not 
possibly relevant for an algorithm to be trained on, which means that fallible, biased people 
are inserting their own values into the “objective” algorithms. “Bias in, bias out,” an adapted 
version of the computer-science idiom “garbage in, garbage out,” coined by Sandra G. 
Mayson, an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Georgia School of Law, 
encapsulates this notion.85 Algorithms’ predictions are only as good as the data on which they 
are trained, so if they are trained on garbage they will produce garbage, and if they are trained 
on biased input they will produce biased output.  
 ProPublica, an independent non-profit newsroom, revealed the implications of 
algorithms trained on biased data producing biased output in its in-depth review of how 
proxy variables can manifest in risk assessment scores. The risk assessment scores 
investigated in ProPublica's report concern scores that inform decisions about who can be set 
free at every stage of the criminal justice system, from assigning bond amounts to priming 
judges during criminal sentencing.86 ProPublica examined risk assessment scores assigned to 
over 7,000 people arrested in Broward County, Florida, as their case study. These scores were 
calculated by a product created by a for-profit company called Northpointe. ProPublica’s 
 
85 Mayson, Sandra Gabriel, Bias In, Bias Out (September 28, 2018). 128 Yale Law Journal 2218 (2019),; University of 
Georgia School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2018-35. Available at SSRN: 
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86 Ibid, footnote 3. 
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report detailed how machine bias was disproportionately impacting Black America, 
explaining that it is “difficult to construct a score that doesn’t include items that can be 
correlated with race such as poverty, joblessness, and social marginalization.”87 Ruha 
Benjamin, an associate professor at Princeton University, comments on this problem of 
machine bias disproportionately affecting Black America in her book, Race After Technology, 
where she explains how ML is trained on data manufactured through histories of exclusion 
and discrimination.88 In her book, she coins the phrase “New Jim Code,” which illuminates 
how biased data reinforces notions of White Supremacy and deepens social inequity. She 
implores her readers to consider the decisive question, do algorithms reduce existing 
inequities or make them worse?89 Similar to bad classifiers, the room for how nuanced 
machine thinking can be when such biased data is authorized to produce such random proxy 
variables is a vulnerable limitation of ADS. 
As mentioned previously, algorithms are very good at discovering proxy variables, 
such as the ones described by ProPublica in their report, but they have no way of accounting 
for them to produce fair and just outcomes. Proxy variables act as confounding factors that 
subject algorithms to anomalous and even spurious output. This output can result in 
discrimination, thus encoding bias in a mathematical sense. ADS have no contextual 
conception of what makes a proxy variable a proxy variable and thus have no corrective 
measure to address this kind of discrimination. The intent of the algorithm is to find 
correlations that facilitate arriving at their goal, not to understand the cause of said 
correlations and how they may produce discriminatory effects. Thus, this potential for 
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discriminatory output is socially and legally unacceptable, inhibiting ADS from establishing 
probable cause that could be permissible in a court of law.  
 
D. Human v. Machine Decision Making Process 
All the previously mentioned limitations of ADS contain some aspect of how machines 
arrive at decisions in a manner that is radically different from that which humans employ. 
This divide in the decision-making process is vital when considering the capacity for 
machines’ decision output to be viable in court. To better understand this difference, consider 
how humans arrive at decisions and contrast that with how machines arrive at decisions in 
order to formulate the differentiating factor(s) that omit machine decision output from legal 
validity.  
The human capacity of “judgment” describes the various steps individuals use when 
trying to reach beyond evidence encountered to draw conclusions from that evidence.90 Thus 
by its nature, human judgment requires a level of extrapolation. To deal with this 
extrapolation, humans employ different thinking strategies dependent on the format of the 
data set and the type of evidence being considered.91 Research in psychology, the scientific 
field of study that explores the human mind and its functions, suggests that humans make 
judgments by relying on a small set of shortcuts called judgment heuristics.92 The two major 
heuristics we deploy are the availability heuristic and the representativeness heuristic.  
The availability heuristic is the strategy of judgment that uses how easily an example 
comes to mind as the basis for assessing how common that example is in the world.93 When an 
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individual is faced with a decision, an individual wants their conclusion to rely on not just one 
observation but on a pattern drawn from various observations that summarize multiple 
experiences. This summary generally requires a comparison among frequency estimates or an 
assessment of how often an individual has encountered a particular example. These 
frequency estimates are central for human judgment, but often the human mind has difficulty 
recalling an objective record of experience. Humans think of specific cases relevant to the 
particular judgment at hand, and if the example comes to mind easily, individuals can 
conclude that the circumstance is a common one. On the other hand, if it takes an individual a 
longer period of time to arrive at the judgment outcome, an individual can conclude that the 
circumstance is nuanced. For many judgment calls, the availability heuristic strategy works 
because events that are frequent in the world are likely to be frequent in our personal 
experience and are therefore well represented in our memories.94 However, there are 
circumstances in which this strategy is misleading because the organization of memory 
creates a bias in what is easily available, leading to an error in frequency, a distorted 
perception, and inadequate precautions exercised in the present case. 95 
The representativeness heuristic relies on broader knowledge to make some forecast 
about the decision at hand. This heuristic of human judgment hinges on the categorization of 
examples assuming that each member of a category is representative of the category and each 
category is relatively homogenous so that every member resembles every other member.96 
The general uniformity in categories allows us to extrapolate from our experiences what to 
expect next time and thus allows us to make judgments off this expectation.97 However, 
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overuse of this heuristic can be dangerous because making one member of a category 
representative of an entire group ignores atypical cases and can lead to erroneous  
conclusions.  
Although these heuristics provide critical insights for the human decision making 
process, individuals often rise above these heuristic shortcuts and rely on other more 
laborious but often more accurate judgment strategies.98 Humans can think within a dual-
process theory of judgment meaning that they can utilize two different types of thinking, one 
that is fast and efficient in a wide range of circumstances, the other that is slower and takes 
more effort but is less risky and often avoids errors.99 Similar to ADS, humans can form 
patterns from presented situations through the aforementioned heuristics that act as a policy 
for the human brain to instantiate.  
However, what differentiates the human decision-making process from that of ADS is 
humans’ ability to recognize patterns outside of what they were taught through utilizing their 
dual-process theory of judgment. If input from a presented situation correlates with 
experiences the human mind has seen in the past, the mind can deploy the fast and efficient 
type of thinking because it is a familiar case, similar to that of ADS. If input from a presented 
situation is outside what the human mind has previously experienced, humans can take a step 
back and evaluate the situation, taking the necessary time to come to the best decision 
possible with the information with which they have been presented combined with the 
information they already know, vastly different from that of ADS. This reflective action of 
recognizing what an individual does not know and allocating the needed time and care to 
figure out the best course of action is a differentiating factor between ADS and human 
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decision-making. Humans reflectivity permits refinement and adjustment of their decision-
making models for missing information and allows them to change their models on the spot 
before they make a decision that affects others. This reflective step allows humans to produce 
an output that is closer to being the right decision where ADS would be blatantly wrong.    
This unique trait of the human decision-making process arises from humans’ 
capability to consider inefficient suboptimal considerations that factor empathy, kindness, 
and ethics into the equation when necessary. Humans understand that not all questions have 
a corresponding right answer, or a definitively correct decision output associated with the 
particular problem. Many times, decisions are convoluted, and the right decision for one 
person may not be a suitable decision for another person. Considerations that factor in 
curiosity, exploration, curation, love, or an experience are all inherently inefficient variables 
that machines struggle to find the value in, yet humans know to be invaluable resources. The 
human brain also exercises imagination, allowing it to imagine possibilities beyond a training 
set. These possibilities may seem illogical or improbable but can be conceivable within a 
given context that if the circumstances were right, they would be able to grapple with. This 
gives humans a unique ability to deal with fringe cases with which ADS immensely struggle. 
As a direct implication of the divide between ADS decision making and that of 
humans, ADS would not be able to establish probable cause under the Fourth Amendment 
because human judgment in judicial discretion is an essential part of probable cause 
determinations, and current technology cannot adequately substitute for wisdom produced 
by the human mind. Kiel Brennan-Marquez, an associate professor of Law and William T. 
Golden Scholar at the University of Connecticut School of Law, affirms this view in his paper, 
Plausible Cause: Explanatory Standards in the Age of Powerful Machines, where he argues that 
statistical accuracy of ADS is not enough of an explanation to substitute for judicial 
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scrutiny.100  He explains the concept of value-pluralism, which assesses “which values are at 
stake in a given decisional environment and ask[s], where necessary, if those values have been 
properly balanced.”101 Our judicial system’s practice of navigating complex lines of value-
pluralism: 
enables judges (1) to consider the plurality of values implicated by the exercise of state 
power and (2) to resolve conflicts between those values in a context-sensitive way. 
Atday’s end, the rationale for individualized review, costly and inefficient as it may be, 
is that in some settings we cannot be sure in advance which values will be implicated 
by the exercise of power. And when that is true, decision making resists automation. 
Decisions must be subject—or at least susceptible—to case-by-case evaluation in order 
to ensure that no particular value or set of values subsumes others.102    
Human dual-process theory of judgment allows us to grapple with value-pluralism in ways 
that ADS cannot because of their unimaginative and rigid policy instantiations that are a 
predetermined and essential part of their structural framework. Despite trans-humanist views 
of modern advances in technological approaches to solving this problem of predetermination, 
ADS still fundamentally lack a capacity to make prudent judgments, which is a crucial aspect 
of a judge’s decision. Therefore, their output cannot establish probable cause under the 
Fourth Amendment.   
F. Thought Experiments 
To further illuminate the limitations of current technological approaches let us 
examine two distinct ML techniques within a legal context. Consider the illustrative example 
 
100 Brennan-Marquez, Kiel, Plausible Cause: Explanatory Standards in the Age of Powerful Machines (September 
5, 2016). Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol. 70 (2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2827733 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2827733 
101 Ibid. 
102  Ibid. 
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of an imaginary judge who is given an affidavit. The judge feeds the affidavit into a supervised 
learning algorithm which has been trained on affidavits labeled by humans and learned what 
characteristics correspond with particular affidavit labels. The algorithm checks if the 
inputted affidavit matches any previously labeled affidavits that were a part of the program’s 
training data. The algorithm then can find commonalities across similar classes of crimes 
through affidavits’ stylized language patterns. For example, drug case’s affidavits typically 
include the phrases “trafficking”, “conspire”, “possess with intent to distribute”, “in violation 
of 21 U.S.C.” among other phrases that can help the algorithm cluster them together.103  After 
finding the similarities, the supervised system produces an answer that fits the label it was 
trained on and accompanies that answer with a confidence level. The algorithm was trained 
on a corpus of legal data including other affidavits that at least resemble the new affidavit 
being input into the algorithm, but the algorithm was not trained on the nuances of this case. 
It may have been trained on previous cases that involved home, car, or office searches but its 
training set did not include computer searches. How meaningful would the affidavits’ 
similarities be in this case? 
Consider the difference between the physical search of a home, car, or office compared 
to that of a digital computer search. A physical search and a digital search are approached in 
different ways, require different specialists, and discover different pieces of evidence. 
Although the varying evidence may lead to the same conclusion, the narrative each piece of 
evidence tells is important for informing the judges outcome. If drugs were found in a home, 
the owner of the drugs could be anyone living in the house or any visitors to the house, with 
 
103 Brandon G. Johnson US District Court Eastern District of Tennesee Greenneville Dviison Affidavit for search 
warrant, Wendy G. Boles U.S. Distirct Court Eastern District of Tennesse at Knoxville Affidavit, Jacquelyn 
Gilliam U.S. Distirct Court for the Eastern Distrcit of Michigan Affidavit, Derek Dunn U.S. District Court for the 
Dirtict of New Hampshier Affidavit in support of applications for search warrant    
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varying degrees of likelihood. If evidence of drug sales were found on a computer, the sale 
could be linked to an individual username which could have been hacked or used by someone 
other than the individual linked to the account, but this likelihood is vastly different from the 
likelihood associated with the drugs found in the house. It is evident to any reasonable person 
that the computer search should not match any other type of search because no other type of 
search is similar enough to be clustered together with a computer search. However, an 
algorithm may disagree and label the computer search as a match with another type of search 
because it does not consider the semantics. How useful would the supervised learning output 
be here to deal with the nuance of a computer search? 
In a similar manner, the imaginary judge feeds the same affidavit into an unsupervised 
learning algorithm which evaluates the affidavit by different metrics. Dissimilar to the 
supervised learning algorithm that compares the given affidavit with affidavits on which it 
was trained, the unsupervised learning algorithm looks at the given affidavit and clusters it 
with other affidavits it finds to be similarly matched based on its own metrics. After it matches 
a cluster of affidavits, humans have the option to go in and label the clusters. Based on the 
cluster in which the given affidavit falls, the judge will be able to make a historically 
consistent decision by following the precedent set by the given affidavits’ cluster.  
The algorithm could run for years, producing reasonable outcomes and keeping the 
judge aligned with precedent. However, some day a defendant could challenge the 
algorithm’s metrics necessitating an audit of the system. The algorithm could have been 
clustering affidavits based on key terms such as ‘loitering,’ ‘traffic violation,’ or 
‘uncooperative.’ These terms may suggest and, in many cases, may be linked to criminal 
activity, but the algorithm has no way to check if these clusters are structured on proxy 
variables that often marginalize minority communities. With this understanding, how would 
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the imaginary judge who feeds the aforementioned affidavit into an unsupervised learning 
algorithm be able to audit the system to ensure the algorithm clusters the affidavits by a 
permissible legal standard and not by proxy variables?  
A system where this process was in part digitized could prove these thought 
experiments viable. With society’s growing lean towards digitalization, a future where this 
possibility is a reality raises interesting questions about whether ADS’s output can constitute 
probable cause to issue a search warrant. In the thought experiment produced above, neither 
supervised nor unsupervised learning algorithms declared definitively if there is or is not 
probable cause. They merely assisted the judge’s determination by evaluating aggregated 
historical data. But the validity of this assistance is problematic when considering the 
limitations of both technical approaches in conjunction with the current operations of 
modern-day courtrooms in America.  
Federal courts very rarely reject affidavits for search warrants; instead, they instruct 
officers how to rework the initial affidavit so it could be accepted on the next submission. This 
creates a shortage of rejected affidavits that can no longer teach the algorithm the standard for 
permissible and impermissible evidence. Fortunately, the courts have a good faith exception, 
which permits evidence if the law was not clear on a particular point, thus providing the 
algorithm with affidavits that were not sufficient, but evidence that was permissible. This 
exception provides a better source of rejected affidavits for the algorithm to determine the 
standard for permissible and impermissible evidence. On account of these two realities of 
legal proceedings, there are very few cases where evidence is suppressed because of 
insufficient affidavits; hence there would not be enough training data for the algorithm to run 
efficiently and satisfactorily. Digitizing this process with current technology would undermine 
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To start, if ADS become explainable, then the limit bounds of their use in society may 




growing field as the need for comprehensive automated answers increases. The inaugural 
Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and 
Transparency took place in 2018 and has taken place in each successive year since convening 
to discuss issues including explainable AI. The conference draws academics from all around 
the world to explore multi-disciplinary approaches to computing machinery ethics. Resulting 
conversations focused on explainable AI mention potential solutions to the interpretability 
problem faced when human experts seek to understand AI output. However, none of the 
proposed solutions are entirely explainable, despite revealing a promising start.  
The question of how much individuals can trust explainable AI outputs would still 
remain, as explainability does not correct all the other vulnerabilities inherent within ADS 









update	the	standard	of	acceptability	in	society.	Until fully operational explainable AI is 
common practice in ADS, the above analysis and this conclusion remain unchanged as they 














The Algorithmic Accountability Act and other bills similar to it will help alleviate the 
strain massive innovation placed on the legal frameworks tasked with protecting citizens from 
the unintended consequences of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. Progressions towards the 
near future where ADS are used in more contexts connected to criminal justice are not out of 
the question, and Congressional support through bills will help address the immediate risks 
posed by such a future. There is a strong constitutional case to be made, as demonstrated 
supra, that current ADS do not meet the rigid legal explainability standard required to 
establish probable cause under the Fourth Amendment because they cannot provide enough 
reliable evidence to justify their output. Therefore, under present legal interpretations and 
available technology, probable cause determinations established from correlations found by 
ADS are impermissible in United States Courts. 
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